OrangePhilosophy

Hi Mark,
What a fun post! Here's my take on things.
I don't think that there's any tension between (3) and (6). The reason is that, as far as I can see, Ned doesn't need to cash out maximal continuity in terms of end-points. In his paper "Simples" (for those who don't know, this is available on his website) he cashes it out in this way:
"x is a maximally continuous object =df x is a spatially continuous object and there is no continuous region of space, R, such that (i) the region occupied by x is a proper subset of R, and (ii) every point in R falls within some object or other."
So I think that, based on this, a good response to your case would be this: there is an object in the world you described, in fact there's exactly one, and it's a simple.

Hey Shieva, I know that Ned would say that in w1 that there is one object, and it is a simple. I say as much. The problem is that when we look at the test for when some stuff does not constitute a thing, that in w1 any mass of matter does not pass the test, and so there is no thing, and then (3) would be false.
So, the problem's still there. There is no portion that constitutes a thing, yet the filled world is a simple, and hence a thing. Pretty odd.

Hi Mark. Thanks for writing a post about my paper.

It seems to me that there are two main errors in your post. Each one is a mistaken inference from things I said in my papers. The mistaken inferences are marked by asterisks in the following quotation from your post.

[Markosian contends that not all portions of stuff constitute a thing (remember, he rejects DAUP and holds that portions are not things), and the example is the arm-shaped portion of stuff which is part of that continuous portion of stuff which constitutes a simple which is in the shape of a statue. *So*, it seems that some portion does not constitute a simple if it has no set of endpoints in all three dimensions which are discontinuous with any other portions. *So*, in order for some portion to constitute a thing it must have some set of endpoints or boundaries. But, in w1 and w2, there are no continuous portions which are discontinuous from any others, and so no thing is constituted by any stuff, and so no thing exists, not even a simple.]

Your first mistake is inferring, from what I said about the arm of the statue, that I am committed to this principle:

Some portion does not constitute a simple if it has no set of endpoints in all three dimensions which are discontinuous with any other portions.

(I’m not sure what you mean by ‘has no endpoints in all three dimensions’, but let us set that worry aside. Apparently you mean something about the relevant portion’s being discontinuous from all other existing portions, and that will be enough for our purposes.)

I don’t know why you think I am committed to such a principle, but I am not. Here is what I am committed to regarding which portions of matter constitute simples.

A portion of matter constitutes a simple if and only if it is a maximally continuous portion of matter.

The second main error is your (related) inference (again from what I said about the statue and the arm) to another principle that you say I am committed to, namely, that a portion of matter constitutes an object only if it is bounded.

Again, I don’t know why you think I am committed to this principle, but I am not. Here is what I am committed to (in virtue of theses endorsed in “Simples,” “Brutal Composition,” and “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People”) regarding which portions of matter constitute objects.

A portion of matter constitutes an object if and only if either (i) it is a maximally continuous portion of matter, or (ii) it is a fusion of two or more maximally continuous portions of matter, and it is a brute fact that the simples constituted by those portions compose a further object.

Since each of your scenarios contains only one maxcon portion of matter, the second disjunct of the right-hand side of this principle never comes into play. Thus, in your first scenario, the infinite portion of matter filling the entire world would constitute a simple, and there would be exactly one object. And in your second scenario, the infinitely long cylinder would constitute a simple, which would be the only object in the world.

Hi Ned,
Thanks for the excellent reply. This settles some of my worries, and
reminds me how I need to read all your articles (related to this) and
see them all together as a unit. That post wasn't a full assessment,
of course, but just noting a couple of troubles, and doesn't touch at
all upon answering the 'simple people' going out of existence worries,
which is the main meat of the paper I take it.
There's still one problem, though, which I think is revealed most by
the following quote from your reply:
"I don't know why you think I am committed to such a principle, but I
am not. Here is what I am committed to regarding which portions of
matter constitute simples:
A portion of matter constitutes a simple if and only if it is a
maximally continuous portion of matter."
But the portion of matter occupying the arm-shaped region is a
maximally continuous portion of matter, and so would be a simple, and
you don't want that.
I guess this perhaps points to difficulties I'm having with (4) and
its relation to MaxCon and MaxCon+ (around page 7 of my copy, maybe
it's the same as yours).
If (4) is true, or that "every maximally continuous portion of matter
constitutes a simple object", how does this square with MaxCon when we
think of all those continuous portions of matter which do not compose
simples, such as the arm-shaped portion of matter which is part of the
Joe Montana statue? (isn't that portion continuous? If so, then if (4)
then it's an object, but, according to MaxCon, it aint').

I guess here's the master question: What's the difference between
being a MaxCon simple and a maximally continuous portion of matter? It
seems that, according to MaxCon, something's a simple if it's not only
continuous but discontinuous from other portions. But, maximally
continuous portions can either be continuous with other portions (in
which case they aren't simples) or not (in which case they are
simples). The worry is that (4) breaks down this distinction.
What do you think? Please excuse my density if I'm making a dumb
mistake or have forgotten some of the parts of the paper about
contact. My plan was to read the whole thing again before I make any
proper full assessment.
I also need to re-read the "Simples" paper, as well as the "SoC it to
me...", "Brutal Composition", and the McDaniel paper (he's coming
here!). Thanks for checking in and replying!

Hi Mark.

It appears that you are forgetting what 'maximally' means in Thesis (4) (which says that every maximally continuous portion of matter constitutes a simple object). Here is the definition of 'maximally continuous portion of matter' (which is just like the definition of 'maximally continuous object'):

x is a maximally continuous portion of matter =df x is a spatially continuous portion of matter and there is no continuous region of space, R, such that (i) the region occupied by x is a proper subset of R, and (ii) every point in R falls within some portion of matter or other.

Given this, Thesis (4) means that every portion of matter that is continuous *and such that it is not a sub-portion of a bigger continuous portion* constitutes a simple.

The arm-shaped portion of matter in the statue example is a continuous portion, but not a maximally continuous one. So it does not constitute a simple.

That clears some things up. I just didn't expect 'maximally continuous portion of matter' and 'maximally continuous object' to be so co-extensive-seeming. The only difference in their definitions is that in, let's call it 'MaxCon portion'[the def you give above]we begin [in the definiens] with 'x is a spatially continuous portion of matter' and with 'MaxCon simple' in the def we begin with 'x is a spatially continuous object'.
The question now is, what's the difference between a spatially continuous object and a spatially continuous portion?
You need some way to differentiate between the two, otherwise every spatially continuous portion would seem to be a spatially continuous object and vice versa.
But certainly there are spatially continuous portions which are not objects.
But you can’t here rely on ‘maximally’ to differentiate between spatially continuous portions and spatially continuous objects, since these notions are used to define ‘maximally’.
This explains my idea why you’d have to introduce the notions of being bounded or somesuch. But, I think you could easily distinguish spatially continuous portions and spatially continuous objects and so this is not a difficult objection, more of a clarificatory question.